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Our Eighteenth Century Constitution, the Electoral College,
and Congressional Reapportionment: A Response to
Professor Daniel Tokaji
ROBERT A. SEDLER
The United States lives under an eighteenth century Constitution that
reflects eighteenth century notions of separation of powers and checks and
balances. The United States Constitution established two houses of Congress
in a "Great Compromise" between large states and small states, so that
California has fifty-three representatives in the House, while Wyoming only
has one, but both states each have two senators.' To the chagrin of Professor
Amar2 and many other constitutionalists throughout the years, the Constitution
provides for indirect election of the President through the Electoral College.
The American constitutional system begins not with the federal govern-
ment, but with the states. Upon independence, each of the newly-formed
states succeeded to power over domestic matters formerly exercised by the
British Crown, and as each new state was admitted to the Union, it
automatically became entitled to exercise this power. Thus, according to
American constitutional theory, state sovereignty is a "given" in the American
constitutional system and the states do not depend on the federal Constitution
for the source of their sovereignty. The states exercise full sovereignty over
domestic matters except to the extent that a particular exercise of such
sovereignty is prohibited or restricted by the Constitution.3  More
1. See the discussion of the "Great Compromise" in Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1,9-16 (1964).
See also U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACTS OF THE UNITED STATES: 2003, SECTION
3 1--CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT PROFILES (2004), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2004pubs.
2. See Akhil Reed Amar, Some Thoughts on the Electoral College, Past, Present, and Future, 33
OHIo N.U. L. REv. 467 (2007).
3. The principle of state sovereignty is textually embodied in the Tenth Amendment, which
provides that, "[t]he powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to
the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." U.S. CONST. amend. X. However, since
state sovereignty is a "given" in the American constitutional system, and since the federal government is
in theory a government of enumerated or limited powers, the principle of state sovereignty is structurally
embodied in the Constitution and is not dependent on the Tenth Amendment. Following independence,
that aspect of the sovereignty of the British Crown pertaining to foreign affairs devolved upon the "Union
of States" that was waging the Revolutionary War and that eventually concluded the peace with Great
Britain. In American constitutional theory, sovereignty over foreign affairs was deemed to be in the federal
government that was subsequently established by the Constitution. Thus, the foreign affairs power is an
inherent federal power. The Supreme Court stated in United States v. Belmont, "in the case of all
international compacts and agreements... complete power over international affairs is in the national
government and is not and cannot be subject to any curtailment or interference on the part of the several
states." 301 U.S. 324, 331 (1937). Note, however, that while the states are expressly prohibited from
entering into treaties with foreign nations, the states may, with Congressional approval, enter into compacts
with foreign nations, as they may with sister states. See U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. Pursuant to this
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significantly, with respect to the Electoral College and congressional
reapportionment, the structure of the federal government itself, as Justice
Blackmun has explained, was designed "to ensure the role of the States in the
federal system."4 According to Justice Blackmun, "the composition of the
Federal Government was designed in large part to protect the States from
overreaching by Congress."5 He goes on to say that:
[t]he Framers thus gave the States a role in the selection both of the
Executive and the Legislative Branches of the Federal Government.
The States were vested with indirect influence over the House of
Representatives and the Presidency by their control of electoral
qualifications and their role in Presidential elections. They were
given more direct influence in the Senate, where each State received
equal representation and each Senator was to be selected by the
legislature of his State.
Before turning to the states and the Electoral College, I want to make some
further observations about the influence of the states in Congress. Professor
Tokaji's article discusses congressional redistricting and the resulting
congressional representation in terms of racial equality Needless to say this
was not the concern of the Framers, who limited the franchise to white male
property owners and who counted the African-American slaves as three-fifths
of a person for the purpose of congressional apportionment. The concern of
the Framers, following the "Great Compromise," was that the House of
Representatives represent "people according to their respective numbers' 8 and
that the Senate represents the "states as states." 9 But the members of the
authorization, some American states have entered into compacts with neighboring Canadian provinces, such
as the Great Lakes Compact entered into between the states bordering the Great Lakes and the Province of
Ontario. 16 U.S.C. § 4723 (2008); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 324.32101 (2007).
4. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 550 (1985). In that case, the Court
held that the structure of the Constitution did not preclude Congress from using its power over interstate
commerce to regulate the "states as states." Id. at 554. In this context, Justice Blackmun discussed how
the structure of the federal government was designed to protect the role of the states in the federal system,
and he concluded that the states' sovereign interests "are more properly protected by procedural safeguards
inherent in the structure of the federal system than by judicially created limitations on federal power." Id.
at 552.
5. Id. at 550-51.
6. Id. at 551 (citation omitted). The influence of the states in the federal government because of
the power of each state to send two Senators to the Senate is not diminished by the fact that under the
Seventeenth Amendment the Senators are selected by the voters rather than by the state legislature. See
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2; U.S. CONST. art. I1, § 1.
7. Daniel P. Tokaji, The Sordid Business of Democracy, 34 OHIo N.U. L REv. 341 (2008).
8. See Brief for the City of Detroit as Arnicus Curie in support of Respondents, at 19, State of
Wisconsin v. City of New York, 517 U.S. 1 (1996) (Nos. 94-1614, 94-1631, 94-1985).
9. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 554.
(Vol. 34
CONGRESSIONAL REAPPORTIONMENT
House of Representatives, no less than the members of the Senate, were
supposed to represent the interests of the state, or more particularly, the
interests of the district of the state from which they were elected.' 0 Under the
Constitution, the states set the voting qualifications for election of members
of the House and after the Seventeenth Amendment, for the election of
senators, and the states are responsible for drawing the congressional districts
within the state." The Constitution also guarantees that each state, regardless
of population, will have at least one Representative in the House.'
The point to be emphasized here is that in the United States, the states as
states are represented in Congress through senators chosen by the voters of the
state and by representatives chosen by voters of congressional districts within
the state. As a matter of constitutional structure, the senators and representa-
tives are to use their power to advance the interests of their states and
congressional districts. To put it another way, in our constitutional system,
senators and representatives are not supposed to serve the national interest.
Instead, the senators and representatives are supposed to serve the interests of
their states and districts. The national interest, in constitutional theory, is the
sum total of that state and congressional district interests that are embodied in
the laws that emerge from the legislative process in Congress.
We turn now to the influence of the states in the Electoral College. The
framers considered the office of the President too important to allow the
President to be elected directly by the people. 3 They feared that the people
would elect a demagogue, which means literally "a leader of the people."
Instead the Framers set up a system by which the people in each state would
elect presidential electors who in turn would choose the most qualified person
to be President. Of course, the framers were thinking of George Washington,
but this system determined whether George W. Bush or John Kerry would be
elected as President in 2004, and it will determine who will be the next
President in 2008. The Electoral College reinforces the power of the states in
10. It is interesting to note that Article L Section 2 refers to members of the House "chosen every
second Year by the people of the several States." U.S. CONST. art. L § 2. During the first fifty years after
the Constitution was adopted, it was the widespread practice of the states to elect representatives as a group
on a statewide basis, and as late as 1842, seven states still elected representative on a statewide basis. See
Wesberry, 376 U.S. at 8-9.
11. Since the House of Representatives is designed to represent people according to their respective
numbers, the Supreme Court has held that Congressional districts within each state must be drawn with
strict mathematical equality, and that there can only be a variance of a few persons from one district to
another. Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725,730 (1983); Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 531 (1969);
Wesberry, 376 U.S. at 9-16.
12. U.S. CONST. art. L § 2, ci. ii.
13. Remember that the people who could vote were limited to white, male property owners.
Restricted as the electorate was, it included artisans, small farmers, and other such persons who were not
part of the landed gentry from which most of the Framers came.
2008]
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the American constitutional system because the electors chosen in each state
then select the President. Each state selects electors equal to that state's
number of representatives and senators, so California gets fifty-five electors
and Wyoming gets three. There are 538 electors, and with the exception of
Maine and Nebraska, which have nine electoral votes between them and
choose to elect by congressional district, it is winner-take-all in the remaining
forty-eight states. Two hundred seventy electoral votes wins the Presidency.
Moreover, the operation of the Electoral College in practice interacts
with the two-party political system that has long prevailed in the United
States. The framers did not contemplate political parties, which they called
factions. They assumed that the leaders of the new government would be men
like themselves, generally born to wealth and privilege with a strong sense of
public service. But political parties emerged early in the Nation's history,
coming to the forefront in the election of 1796, and being firmly established
in the election of 1800, with the Jeffersonian-Democrats and the Federalists.
Following the confusion regarding the electoral voting for President and Vice-
President in the 1800 election, the Twelfth Amendment was adopted in 1804
and provided for separate candidates for President and Vice-President.
Professor Amar maintains that the Twelfth Amendment "transformed the
Framers' framework, enabling future presidential elections to be openly
populist and partisan affairs featuring two competing tickets."' 4 After the
election of 1860, it was the Democrats and the Republicans that emerged as
the two major parties and this two-party system has continued to the present
day. Third parties and independent candidates may be significant in a parti-
cular election-such as Ross Perot in 1992 and Ralph Nader in 2000-but the
structure of the federal government, including the Electoral College method
of electing a President, single-member districts for Congress, and statewide
elections of senators, is not conducive to the survival of third parties.'5
14. Amar, supra note 2, at 469.
15. A third party may tip a particular election, as Ralph Nader's Green Party presumably did in the
2000 election, but Nader and the Green Party are no longer a factor in national politics. In the 2000 election
Nader received 2,882,995 votes or 2.74% of the total. He received 97,488 votes in Florida, most of which
were presumed to be at the expense of Al Gore. So if Nader had not been running, Gore likely would have
carried Florida and would have won the election. Nader ran again in 2004, and this time received only
406,924 votes out of some 118 million cast. The high water mark of third party candidacy for the
Presidency would appear to be the 1992 Presidential election, where Ross Perot captured 19% of the
popular vote, compared to Bill Clinton's 43% and George Bush's 38%. However, it appears that Perot drew
votes away from Clinton and Bush in roughly equal numbers. In the 1996 election, Perot ran again, this
time receiving 9% of the vote compared to 49% for Bill Clinton and 41% for Bob Dole. Perot and the party
that he formed to support his candidacy have since disappeared from the American political scene. The last
time that a third party candidate received electoral votes was in the 1968 election, when George Wallace,
running as the candidate of the American Independent Party, carried five states for a total of forty-six
electoral votes: Arkansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, and Georgia.
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At the present time, and in retrospect, through much of the last century,
the Nation has been equally divided between both parties when it comes to
electing a President. Of the twenty-five presidential elections between 1900
and 1996, the Republicans won thirteen, and the Democrats won twelve. This
division was reflected in the very close elections of 2000 and 2004.
Moreover, one party or another is the dominant party, at least when it comes
to Presidential elections, in the great majority of American states. The "blue
states" that are likely to vote Democratic include California, New York,
Illinois, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and most of the New England states, and
the "red states" that are likely to vote Republican include Texas, Oklahoma,
Kansas, Nebraska, the Dakotas, most of the southern states, and most of the
mountain states. Because so many states are likely to vote for one party over
another in the Presidential race, that race, which is based on winning a
majority of the electoral votes, comes down to less than twenty battleground
states, such as Florida, Ohio, Michigan, Minnesota, Wisconsin, Missouri,
Iowa, Washington, Oregon, and Colorado. It is in the battleground states
where the candidates concentrate their campaigning and the parties
concentrate their resources.
Professor Amar has done a very thorough historical analysis of the
factors leading to what he has called an "intricate [E]lectoral [C]ollege con-
traption."' 6 This analysis concludes that the framers' primary reason for
electing the President by means of an Electoral College was not so much, as
I have suggested, a lack of confidence in the ability of the people to make a
good choice, or an effort to balance the interests of large and small states, but
to give an advantage to the southern states who received more votes in the
Electoral College because their slaves counted as three-fifths of a person. 7
This not only increased their representation in the House of Representatives,
but as Professor Amar demonstrates, it increased their ability to elect a
President. Therefore, he submits, the Electoral College had a pro-slavery tilt,
and legislatures were aware of this pro-slavery tilt at the time of the Twelfth
Amendment.1 8 Professor Amar believes the Twelfth Amendment "fixed" the
Electoral College, stating "[o]nce again, the North caved to the South by
refusing to insist on [a] direct national election." 9
16. Amar, supra note 2, at 467.
17. Id. at 470-71. He notes that "the Framers required that the House be elected directly every two
years," and says that "[m]any leading Federalists supported direct election of governors." Id. at 469. He
then points out that the key objection to direct election of the President was "not democracy per se, but
democracy based on inadequate voter information." Id. However, he maintains that "[tihe early emergence
of national presidential parties rendered this objection obsolete... by linking presidential candidates to
slates of local candidates and national platforms that explained to voters who stood for what." Id.
18. Amar, supra note 2, at 471.
19. Id.
2008]
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Regardless of the primary factor or factors influencing the adoption of
the Electoral College as the means of electing the President, it is difficult to
justify such a method today. Professor Amar counters all of the arguments
made in favor of retaining the Electoral College, and demonstrates con-
vincingly that in terms of democratic values, direct election of the President
is far preferable to the out-moded Electoral College method that is in use
today.2"
Professor Amar concludes by addressing what he calls the "futility
argument:" that adopting a direct popular election would require a constitu-
tional amendment, and that no such amendment is likely given the high
hurdles set out in Article V that two-thirds of both houses of Congress and
three-quarters of the states approve it.21 And of course, in general terms, it is
very difficult to amend the Constitution. The men who drafted the Constitu-
tion were incredible egotists. They believed they had developed the perfect
document for representative government, and made the Constitution very
difficult to amend. Most proposed amendments fail to get the necessary two-
third votes in both houses. A politically-popular amendment, such as one
banning flag-burning or same sex marriage, can pass the House, since
Representatives have to run for election every two years and do not want to
give their potential opponent an easy shot. But that same proposed
amendment will most likely be defeated in the Senate, where there are enough
senators who are in safe seats or are enough years away from having to run for
reelection that they can safely vote against the amendment. Even when an
amendment manages to get the two-thirds vote in both houses of Congress, it
may flounder on the "three-fourths of the states" approval requirement, as
happened with the Equal Rights Amendment. It should not be surprising,
therefore, that apart from the ten amendments of the Bill of Rights, which is
considered a part of the original Constitution because it was promulgated
"practically contemporaneous with the adoption of the original, 22 there have
only been seventeen other amendments to the Constitution in its 200 year
history.23
Conceding the virtual impossibility of amending the Constitution to
provide for direct national election of the President, Professor Amar maintains
that this could be achieved without amending the Constitution.2" He asks the
reader to join him "in an exercise of legal imagination" and proposes both a
20. Id.
21. Id. at 476
22. The Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 67 (1873).
23. Two of these amendments, the Eighteenth Amendment, establishing Prohibition, and the
Twenty-First Amendment, repealing it, cancel each other out.
24. Amar, supra note 2, at 476-79.
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"key state" and a "key persons" scenario.25 Under the "key state" scenario, the
eleven most populous states, having 271 votes between them (one more than
the 270 needed to win the Electoral College vote) would enact the following
statute: "[t]his state shall choose a slate of electors loyal to the Presidential
candidate who wins the national popular vote. 2 6 In order to avoid a claim of
"unilateral disarmament," the statute would go into effect "if and only if'
other states, whose electors taken together with this state's electors total at
least 270, also enact laws guaranteeing that they will choose electors loyal to
the Presidential candidate who wins the national popular vote. The "key
persons" scenario would have both sets of candidates for President and their
running mates pledge that if they lose the national popular vote, they will ask
their electors to vote for the winner of the national popular vote.28
Of course, Professor Amar does not suggest that either of these scenarios
is likely to happen in the real world. He recognizes it is highly unlikely that
the Constitution will be amended to provide for direct national election of the
President, and the United States will continue to elect our President under
what he calls the "intricate [E]lectoral [C]ollege contraption. '"29 Professor
Amar obviously considers this a bad thing.
I take a somewhat different view. My view on this and many other
constitutional governance issues is shaped by the fact that we live under an
eighteenth century Constitution that is very difficult to amend. A new nation
starting out today and seeking to achieve democratic governance would not
borrow from our eighteenth century Constitution. Certainly, the new nation
would provide for the direct national election of its President or head of
government, either by way of a "winner take all plurality," or more likely, if
neither candidate obtains a majority during the first round, by a runoff
between the two candidates receiving the highest number of votes.30 Indeed,
this is how most modem democratic countries operating under constitutions
that are not 200 years old elect their President or head of government.
But we are not a new Nation. We are a Nation that began with sovereign
states and promulgated a Constitution that "in all of its provisions, looks to an
25. Id. at 476.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 478.
28. Id.
29. Amar, supra note 2, at 467.
30. The recent French Presidential election serves as a model: there were three major candidates,
and neither candidate received a majority in the first round, so a second round was held between the two
candidates receiving the highest number of votes in the first round. 2007 French Presidential Elections,
WASH. POST, Apr. 13, 2007, available at http:flwww.washingtonpost.comlwp-dyn/content/articlet2007/04/
13/AR2007041301401 _pf.html.
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OHIO NORTHERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
indestructible Union, composed of indestructible states."'" This Constitution
gives the states as states a role in the election of the President through the
Electoral College.32 We have conducted fifty-four Presidential elections under
this "intricate [E]lectoral [C]ollege contraption." I would submit that this
method of electing a President has worked tolerably well for us and that we
can continue to elect our President by this method without creating any kind
of serious risk to our system of constitutional governance.
The problem with the Electoral College method of electing the President,
as Professor Amar sees it, is that the national popular vote loser can win the
Electoral College vote.33 According to Professor Amar, this is what happened
in the 2000 election when the Democratic candidate, Al Gore, received about
600,000 more popular votes than the Republican candidate, George W. Bush.
Bush received a majority of the electoral votes and was elected President. It
could also have happened in the 2004 election if the Democratic candidate
John Kerry had carried Ohio. This would have given Kerry a majority of the
electoral votes, although Bush had a three-million vote advantage in the
popular vote.34
With all due respect, I submit that this formulation of the issue by
Professor Amar is structurally flawed because there is no national popular
vote for the Presidency. What we call the national popular vote for the
Presidency is not the kind of vote that would be taking place if there were a
direct election of the President. In Presidential elections, we do not run a
separate popular vote for the President and a separate vote for electors in the
Electoral College; we only run one vote in which the voters vote for electors
in each state. The so-called national popular vote for the Presidency is not a
popular vote at all, but only the total of the votes that each candidate received
when voters were voting state by state for electors from each state. There is
no way of knowing what the national popular vote would look like if voters
were voting directly for the President, because this is not how the system
presently works.
If voters were voting directly for the President, not only would every
voter's ballot count equally in a single nationwide vote, as Professor Amar
31. Texas v. White, 74 U.S. 700, 725 (1869). Because of this, the Court held that during the civil
war the Confederate states were still a part of the Union, although they were trying to secede from it.
32. See the discussion supra notes 3-4, and accompanying text.
33. Amar, supra note 2, at 467.
34. Bush won the electoral vote, 286 to 251. He carried Ohio, with its twenty electoral votes, by
only 118,599 votes out of over 5,600,000 votes cast. If Kerry had prevailed in this very close vote in Ohio,
he would have received 271 electoral votes to Bush's 266 electoral votes and would have been elected
President. In the highly disputed Hayes-Tilden election of 1876, the loser Tilden had more popular votes




maintains it should,35 but every voter's ballot would count period. There
would be no "lost votes" by those voting in the state that their candidate failed
to carry, including states where their candidate lost by a large margin. At the
present time, the votes of Republicans in California, New York,
Massachusetts and a number of other "blue states," and the votes of Demo-
crats in Texas, Oklahoma, Mississippi and a number of other "red states," do
not count at all.
While this point buttresses Professor Amar's argument in favor of a
direct national election of the President, it also emphasizes the structural flaw
which he claims only exists in the Electoral College method: that the popular
vote winner can nonetheless lose in the Electoral College. There is no popular
vote winner under the Electoral College method of electing the President for
the simple reason that there is no direct popular vote. The voters are voting
for electors on a state-by-state basis, and the reported popular vote is nothing
more than a report of the total vote cast for electors in all the states. It bears
no resemblance at all to the mythical popular vote that would exist if the
voters were voting for the direct election of the President, where every vote
counted in every state, and both candidates campaigned to win every vote in
every state.
Whatever may be wrong with the Electoral College system, it cannot be
that the popular vote loser can nonetheless win the Electoral College because
the election is not about winning the popular vote. It is about winning the
Electoral College, and the popular vote is completely irrelevant in light of this
primary objective.36 Candidates and political parties do not think or operate
in terms of winning more popular votes than the other side. They think only
in terms of electoral votes and "carrying a state" so that they reach the all-
important number of 270 electoral votes needed to win the Presidency.
Because we have elected our President by the Electoral College through
fifty-four elections, and the Presidential election is conducted by our political
parties with reference to the operation of the Electoral College, I submit that
this method of electing the President is an integral part of the American
political system and is fully accepted by the American people. If John Kerry
had carried Ohio in the 2004 election and had been elected President despite
George Bush's 3,337,000 vote advantage in the popular vote, we may ask
what would have happened. The Republican Party would have cried foul, just
as the Democratic Party cried foul, after the Supreme Court's decision in Bush
35. Amar, supra note 2.
36. Contrary to the claims of some of his opponents, Bill Clinton was not a minority President in
1992 when he received only 43% of popular vote, because he received a large majority in Electoral College.
It is also irrelevant that Al Gore received more popular votes than George Bush in 2000, since Bush, carried
Florida and received more electoral votes.
2008]
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v. Gore" effectively awarded the 2000 Presidential race to Bush. But the
Republican Party, President Bush, and the American people would have
accepted the result just as the Democratic Party, Al Gore, and the American
people accepted the result in the 2000 election. There would have been cries
to eliminate the Electoral College and a flurry of proposals to provide for
direct popular election of the President, but the cries would have died down
in a few weeks, and the flurry of proposals would have been debated by
academics, but not even considered by our Congress. This is how we elect our
President; it is certainly not the best way, but it is our way.
There is another reason why the Electoral College is here to stay: all of
the states like the system. The system ensures that every state has some
measurable say in the election of the President; Wyoming with its three
electoral votes has a small say while California with fifty-five electoral votes
has a larger say, but every state has some say. The three electoral votes of
Wyoming and the other small states could tip an otherwise close Presidential
election. At a minimum, the electoral votes of the small states are recorded.
If there were a direct popular election of the President, the small popular vote
in the small states would go unnoticed; it would be swallowed up in the grand
total. This may explain why senators or representatives do not make proposals
for the replacement of the Electoral College with a form of direct election of
the President. Those proposals would not sit well with the political leaders of
both parties in their home states. For better or for worse, the American people
elect their President through the Electoral College. This is an essential feature
of the American constitutional system.
We now turn to Professor Tokaji's discussion of congressional
redistricting and racial equality."8 Professor Tokaji discusses what he calls the
"sordid" history of voting rights in the United States, a history that he says is
"intertwined with the struggle for racial equality, particularly by African-
Americans." 9 He goes on to point out that roughly contemporaneous with the
Supreme Court's decisions on minority voting rights, "the Court has struggled
to come up with a workable solution to the problem of partisan
gerrymandering."' Professor Tokaji does an excellent job of identifying the
four norms of democracy implicated by the minority voting rights and partisan
gerrymandering cases and demonstrating the tensions between them.4' The
four norms are minority representation, race-blindness, anti-entrenchment, and
37. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
38. Tokaji, supra note 7.
39. Id. at 342.
40. Id. at 348.
41. Id. at 342.
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state sovereignty." He says these tensions came together in the LULAC
case.43 As a result of these tensions, in each of the four areas a similar pattern
of development may be discerned. The Court starts off with a sweeping
articulation of a core principle of democratic governance, only to pull back on
that principle in subsequent cases." He concludes that, "[tihe tension between
these norms... is undoubtedly part of the explanation for this phenomenon.
To fully realize any one of these norms would require an abdication of one or
more of the others. 45
While the Court indicated that claims of unconstitutional partisan
gerrymandering might be justiciable, the result in LULAC was that the Court
majority rejected this claim. At the same time, a different Court majority,
with Justice Kennedy casting the deciding vote on both issues, held that the
redrawing of one of the districts to eliminate its Latino, voting age majority
impermissibly diluted Latino votes in violation of section 2 of the Voting
Rights Act.46 In commenting on the Court's Voting Rights Act holding in this
case, Professor Tokaji states that, "it embraces constitutional law's traditional
preoccupation with the protection of minorities who cannot adequately protect
their interests through ordinary political channels, 47 and that it "represents a
worthy effort to incorporate a traditional concern of constitutional
adjudication into the interpretation of a civil rights statute. '48 He concludes
that the likely role of the federal courts in the redistricting process will be to
"view with an especially skeptical eye attempts by a legislative majority to
advance its own partisan self-interest, at the expense of a racial minority
group, as did the majority in LULAC. ' 4 9
I now want to come back to our eighteenth century Constitution and the
role of the states in our federal system, in particular their role with respect to
congressional redistricting. While our Constitution gives states the power to
control voter qualifications and to establish congressional districts within the
state, subsequent amendments, beginning with the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
and continuing through the Nineteenth, Twenty-fourth, and Twenty-sixth,
qualify this power by prohibiting the states from discriminating against racial
minorities, women, the poor and young voters with respect to the right to vote.
The implementation clauses of these amendments gives Congress the specific
42. Id.
43. League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry (LULAC), 126 S. Ct. 2594, 2663 (2006)
(Roberts, C.J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
44. Tokaji, supra, note 7, at 349.
45. Id. at 353.
46. 42 U.S.C. § 1973; LULAC, 126 S. Ct. at 2626; Tokaji, supra note 7, at 342.
47. Tokaji, supra note 7, at 357.
48. Id. at 358.
49. Id. at 359.
20081
OHIO NORTHERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
power to enforce their requirements with appropriate legislation."0 The
Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause has been interpreted as
embodying the principle of equal representation for equal numbers of people
and therefore prohibiting legislative malapportionment.5 Article I, Section
2 requires that congressional districts within each state must be drawn "as
nearly as is practicable [so that] one man's vote in a congressional election is
to be worth as much as another's. 5 2  The Constitution, as amended,
significantly restricts the ability of the states to discriminate against discrete
groups with respect to the right to vote and imposes significant limitations on
the power of the states to draw congressional districts.
Given our two-party system, congressional redistricting is necessarily a
partisan political matter. At the present time, the Court has not imposed any
constitutional limits on the power of Congress to engage in partisan political
redistricting. The only realistic limit, as addressed in LULAC and as Professor
Tokaji explains, is that the states cannot use their power over congressional
redistricting in such a way as to dilute the political power of racial
minorities.53 The remaining question, which is only partially answered by the
holding in LULAC, is how to determine whether a particular redistricting
dilutes the political power of racial minorities.
The United States lives under an eighteenth century Constitution. Under
this Constitution, we elect a President by means of an Electoral College.
Under this Constitution, with its voting rights amendments, the states control
congressional redistricting except to the extent that a particular redistricting
improperly dilutes the political power of racial minorities. For better or for
worse, this is the American way of electing a President and of drawing
congressional districts.
50. The Voting Rights Act was enacted pursuant to Congressional enforcement power under section
2 of the Fifteenth Amendment. U.S. CONST. amend XV, § 2; South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301,
325-26 (1966).
51. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 560-61 (1964); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 207-08 (1962).
52. Kirkpatrick, 394 U.S. at 527-28 (1969).
53. LULAC, 126 S. Ct. at 2626; Tokaji, supra note 7, at 342.
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